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or sexual orientation.Choices regarding the degree of centralization or decentralization of
decision making are important for agribusiness firms and, in particular,  for
agricultural cooperatives.  The agricultural cooperative sector  is  character-
ized by two alternative forms of organization structure.  The federated system
of cooperatives,  which predominates in the Midwest,  is  an example of decentral-
ization.  Farmers belong to  local cooperatives which are,  in turn,  members of
regional cooperatives.  Centralization of decision making characterizes  the
centralized system of cooperatives, which can be found in the Northeast and
Southeast.  In this case farmers are members of the centralized cooperative,
which compares  in size and function to  the regionals  in the federated system.
The centralized cooperative  operates service outlets that farmers encounter on
a day-to-day basis.
As noted by van Ravenswaay, centralization of decision making authority
is  an issue common in the organization design literature.  This issue has,
however,  received little attention in the economics  literature.  A recent
article by Sah and Stiglitz is  one exception.  They present a model which
considers how the structure of an organization affects errors  in decision
making and,  therefore,  the quality of decision making.  In particular
questions regarding the probability that new projects will be undertaken and
overall profitability with different organization structures are considered.
In this paper we modify and extend the model of Sah and Stiglitz to  evaluate
different aspects of economic efficiency for alternative  industry structures.
In the sections which follow we  first describe  the model we use to
consider  the effects of centralization versus decentralization  of investment
decisions.  We then use  the model to  derive optimization conditions  that yield2
information on the probability that a project will be adopted,  the expected
profit for the firm and for  the. industry as a whole, and firms'  expenditure
on information.  Comparative static analysis is  performed to  consider how
firms  adjust their expenditure on information as a result of structural and
environmental changes.  A numerical example is then presented, followed by
conclusions and suggestions for further study.
The Model
This model is developed from the perspective of firms evaluating and
ultimately adopting or rejecting investment projects.  The profit maximizing
decision for a firm is  to accept all projects with a  positive net return and
reject all projects with a negative net return, since the net return includes
opportunity costs.  A key aspect of this analysis is the  fact that firms
evaluate projects without perfect information and,  as a result,  reject some
good projects and accept some bad projects.  As  firms acquire more  informa-
tion,  the proportion of good projects  rejected and the proportion of bad
projects accepted is reduced.
This model  assumes that firms choose a level of expenditure on informa-
tion, evaluate a set of projects and, according to a decision rule,  adopt  some
proportion of this set.  The  initial portfolio of projects,  from which firms
are assumed to  receive a random draw, is specified by a probability distribu-
tion,  f(X).  Projects which are adopted by the  industry make up the  final
portfolio of projects which depends upon the distribution of the initial port-
folio of projects,  the structure of the  industry, the decision rule  employed
and the level of expenditure on information.
The alternative industry structures considered in this  study are shown in
Figure 1.  In the Pure  Polyarchy, a number of firms  independently evaluate and3
Figure  1:  Industry Structures
Pure Polyarchy
Each project is independently evaluated by each of the n firms
with a decision to  accept or reject.
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Projects  that are  accepted by the centralized decision maker
are  then evaluated by the decentralized units,
which independently decide  to accept or reject projects.
Centralized
Decision Maker4
undertake projects.  All projects are available for adoption by all firms.
This case resembles the decisions of local cooperatives in the federated
system.  The industry consists of one  firm with a number of production units
in the Pure Hierarchy.  Projects  are evaluated centrally and,  if accepted,  are
implemented in all production units.  The centralized cooperative system is
best described by this structure.  In the final  structure, Mixed-Decentralized
Decision,  decision makers at both the decentralized and the centralized level
evaluate projects.  All projects are  first reviewed centrally and,  if
accepted, are  forwarded to  the decentralized firms which independently
evaluate and accept or reject projects.  This resembles  the federated
cooperative system when an investment project is  first identified by the
regional cooperative.  Local cooperatives are then free to  adopt or  reject
projects that are recommended by the regional.
To allow for comparisons among the industry structures,  it  is  assumed
that  the decentralized firms  in the  Pure Polyarchy and the Mixed-Decentralized
Decision are equal  in size and number to  the production units  in the  Pure
Hierarchy.  It  is further assumed that the net benefit  any one firm or produc-
tion unit experiences is  independent of whether or not others develop  the
project.  This assumption will hold if the nature of the projects  is  such that
its net benefit is not  influenced by the number adopting the project or  if the
industry  is  small relative  to  the rest  of the world.
As noted earlier,  the decision rule influences the  final portfolio of
projects.  In evaluating a project,  decision makers observe a net return equal
to  some value Y.  Decision makers accept projects when Y > 0 and reject
projects when Y < 0.  Since decision makers have incomplete  information
regarding projects,  the observed net return for a project will differ from5
its true net return.  Defining the  true net return as X, it follows that
Y - X + 8.  In this  analysis,  it will be assumed that 8 is a normally
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance (Ye  . The probability
that a decision maker accepts a given project with net return  Xi  is:
P(Yi)  > 0  - P(Xi + 8  > 0)  - 4(Xi/0e),
where t(Xi/Cg)  is  the standard normal  distribution evaluated at  (Xi/(g).
Although this analysis considers  the critical value for accepting or rejecting
a project to be zero,  the analysis could easily be adjusted for some alter-
native critical value.  Sah and Stiglitz  identify how the reservation level
or  critical value  that decision makers  select changes with the industry
structure.
The focus of this study  is on how the  firm's expenditure on information
varies with industry structure.  Acquisition of information reduces uncer-
tainty by reducing (9 according to  a cost of information function,  c(09),
with ac/a95  < 0.  In this analysis,  the cost function is  assumed to have  the
form  Y/09.  Each.  firm is,  thus,  faced with the problem of adjusting 0U  to
maximize expected return minus expenditure on information.  All firms face  the
same cost of information function and know its  form with certainty.
For a firm in the polyarchy,  the probability of accepting a particular
project  is  t(X/09).  With n firms  in the  industry,  the probability that a
particular project is  adopted by at least one firm is  one minus the prob-
ability that none of the  firms  adopt the project or 1-(l-'>(X/Og))n. For any
one  firm in the  Pure  Polyarchy,  evaluating m projects  the  objective  is  to:
(1)  Max  mJ  [  X f(X)P(X/09)]dX - (Y/C9)6
The  first order condition for this maximization problem is:
(2)  J  [  X2 f(X)>(X/a8 )]dX  - (y/m)
where O(X/C8) is  the standard normal density evaluated at (X/a8 ).
A sufficient condition for the existence of a local maximum in this and
the next two cases  is  that the second derivative of the objective function
with respect to C9 be less  than zero.  With f(X) assuming a normal distribu-
tion this second order condition holds  if 0d > 2, where  . is  the mean of the
distribution.
From equation two one can see  that,  irrespective of the initial port-
folio,  as  the number of projects, m, increases,  the firm will spend more on
information, decreasing C8. To maintain the equality in equation two,  the
decrease  in the right-hand side of the equation must matched by a decrease  in
the left-hand side  of the equation.  O(X/a9) is  the only left-hand side term
which the  firm has any control over and will decrease as O9 decreases.
Similarly as y, the parameter of the cost function,  increases,  the  firm will
spend less on information and thus  increase aB.
The probability that the pure hierarchy will accept a given project is
4(X/ag).  Since  the acceptance or rejection of a project is  determined solely
by  the decision of the hierarchy,  the probability that a given project is
adopted is also  $(X/ag).  Since a project has n chances of being accepted in
the pure polyarchy and only one chance in the pure hierarchy,  the probability




The objective for the firm in the hierarchy is  to:
(3)  Max  mn  f  [  X f(X)*(X/C8)]dX  - (y/a 8)
The first order condition for this  maximization problem is:
(4)  J  [  X2 f(X) (X/89)]dX  - (Y/(n m))
The same comparative static results hold for the hierarchy as  for the
polyarchy with respect  to changes  in the number of projects  and the parameter
of the cost function.  It also  follows  that as  the number of production units,
n, increases,  the hierarchy will spend more on information,  thereby reducing
the level of C8 .
In the Mixed-Decentralized Decision structure decision makers at both
the centralized and the decentralized level are acquiring information to
reduce a8. For  this  structure the subscript c on Ca will refer  to the
centralized firm while  the subscript d to  the decentralized firm.  The
probability that a given project is  accepted by a given decentralized firm is
[~(X/Yeo)'-(X/a 8d)],  since  it must first be  accepted by the centralized firm
with a probability of *(X/geo)  and then accepted by the  decentralized firm
with a  probability of ~(X/Cga).  The probability that a given project is
adopted by at least one of the decentralized firms is 1-[1-(4(X/Ca)  *(X/Co))]
It can be shown analytically, under fairly unrestrictive assumptions,  that
(1-[1-(*(X/o)'^^(X/CT~))] n } <  (X/(8),
and, therefore,  that a  project has  the  smallest probability of being accepted
in this third system.  The  intuitive explanation is that a  project must
pass  through two evaluation processes  in this  latter structure,  making it8
more difficult for acceptance than in either the Pure Polyarchy or the
Pure Hierarchy.
Since a project has the greatest chance of being adopted in the Pure
Polyarchy and the least chance in the Mixed-Decentralized Decision structure,
for any given portfolio of projects,  the greatest percentage of projects will
be adopted in the Pure Polyarchy,  followed by the Pure Hierarchy and the Mixed-
Decentralized Decision structure.  One would expect,  therefore system-wide
profits to be greatest in the Pure Polyarchy when the initial portfolio
contains mostly good projects.  Alternatively,  if the initial portfolio
contains a majority of bad projects  the Mixed-Decentralized Decision structure
will yield the highest expected profit.
Defining the share of net return received by the decentralized firm as s
and the share  received by the centralized firm as  (l-s),  the objective for  the
centralized firm in Case 3 is  to:
(5)  Max  (l-s)mn  j [  X f(X)~(X/ff)c(X/ag)]dX-y/~c)
The  first order condition for this maximization problem is:
(6)  1  [  x2 f(X)%(X/Ca)'P(X/Ca9)]dX  - (y/((l-s) n m))
The same comparative static results hold for this centralized firm as  for the
Pure Hierarchy with respect to  the parameter of the cost function, the number
of projects and the number of decentralized units.  If the share of the net
return that the centralized unit receives,  (l-s),  increases the firm will
spend more on information,  thus  reducing the level of AC. If the centralized
firm receives all  of the net return (s-0),  and the decentralized firms do not
always accept all projects,  4(X/agd) <1,  the centralized firm will spend less9
on information than the Pure Hierarchy.  Since it  is more realistic to
consider the case where s>O,  there  is  even more reason to believe that  the
centralized unit will spend less on information than the Pure Hierarchy.  The
objective for the decentralized firm in Case  3 is  to:
(7) Max  s m I [  X f(X) (X/Q6 o)  (X/(X  d)]dX  - (y/8ed)
The first order condition for this maximization problem is:
(8)  J [  X2 f(X)A(X/Cd)t(X/(CJ)]dX  - (y/(s m))
The  same comparative static results hold for this  decentralized firm as  for
the Pure Polyarchy with respect to  the parameter of the cost function and the
number of projects.  It can be shown that as  the share of the net return that
the decentralized firm receives,  s, increases  the firm will spend more on
information, thus reducing the level of 6Cd.  If the decentralized firm
receives all  of the net return (s-l),  and the centralized firm does not always
accept all projects,  cD(X/(a)<l,  the decentralized firm will spend less on
information than the Pure Polyarchy.  With s<l,  there is  further evidence  that
the decentralized firm will spend less on information than the Pure Polyarchy.
To consider  the level of expenditure on information that  the firms  in
the mixed case would make if their objective was to maximize the industry
returns,  we consider the objective of the social planner:
(9) Max  mnJ[Xf(X)<(X/C8o)~(X/(O8d)]dX  - n  (Y/y8ed)  - (Y/U8o)
9o , Cad
The first order  conditions for this maximization problem are:
(10)  I  [  X2 f(X)$(X/aCs)@(X/Tid)]dX  - (Y/(n  m))
(11)  | [  X2 f(X)O(X/U7i)%(X/(eY)]dX  - (y/(m))10
A sufficient condition for the existence of a local maximum is  that  the second
derivative matrix from the objective function be negative semi-definite.
Comparing the first order conditions  of the social planners' problem to
those of the individual firms'  maximization problem,  and noting that 0< s <1,
it can be shown that all firms  spend less on information when making indepen-
dent profit maximizing decisions  than if they were maximizing industry
returns.
Further comparative static analysis can be performed for the Pure
Hierarchy and the Pure Polyarchy if some structure  is  assumed for  the  to  the
probability distribution of the  initial portfolio.  In particular, we assume
that the  initial portfolio of projects  is normally distributed with mean X
and variance P2 . The  first order condition for the Pure Polyarchy case,  after
substituting for f(X) and $(X/Ca),  becomes:
(12)  1  X2  1--  -- exp  - X2
_s  Hi  f;  \  2  (  )+  )  dX  m
By completing the square in the expression exp(-1/2[((X-X)2/p2)+(X2/(a2)]}  and
rearranging terms,  one obtains an expression of the form K I  X2g(X)dx, where
g(X)  is a normal density function with mean C2SX/(p2 +C62)  and variance
p2(62/(p2 +a9 2).  Noting that J  X2g(X)dX -E(X2) and that E(X2) is equal  to  the
square of the mean plus  the variance the following can be obtained:
(13)  Jlexp  "[-L  2  -P  l  ae 3 + p2 fA5 +  42_A5|  y
X  L2 p+ 82  l  (j  2+  C2)'2  f2  f  m
Equation 13 holds for the Pure Hierarchy with the right-hand side replaced
with Y/mn.  It can be shown from this first order condition that an increase
in the mean of the initial portfolio will cause an increase in the expenditureon information,  8Yg/aa <  0,  if Oi  >0,  aT2  >  p2  and  2582 >  2 . The
intuitive explanation of the conditions is  as  follows.  The condition  Ua  >  p2
identifies  that firms will invest in reducing uncertainty when the mean of the
initial portfolio increases  if  the variance that they have control over,  CU2  ,
is greater than the variance that they have not control over,  P2.  As  the mean
of the  initial portfolio increases,  firms'  expected net return increases
enabling them to afford to spend more on information.  However,  as  the mean of
the  initial portfolio increases,  firms know there  is  a better chance that the
projects  they consider are good and do not spend as  much on information.  The
condition 2U'82  >  c02  reflects these two  forces.
Numerical Example
A  numerical example illustrates the impact on expected profits  for  the
Pure Polyarchy and the  Pure Hierarchy of changes  in the distribution of the
initial portfolio,  the number of projects examined and the number of decentral-
ized units  in the system.  Table I reports the results  for five cases.  The
profit maximizing level of U8 was determined from equation 13  and then
substituted into equations one and three  to  obtain the maximum level of
expected profits.  Numerical integration was used to evaluate  equations one
and three,  since analytical integration  is not possible.
Considering Case 1 as the base case and comparing the other cases to  it,
one observes  that, as  expected, an increase  in the mean of the initial
distribution, the number of projects or the number of decentralized units
results  in an increase  in expected profit.  An increase in the  standard
deviation of the initial distribution also results  in an increase  in expected
profit due to the fact that there are now projects  in the initial portfolio
with a much larger net return.12
Table 1.  Expected Profit and Optimal Level of ag
Pure Polyarchv  Pure Hierarchy
Optimal  Expected  Optimal  Expected
ag Profit  ae  Profit
(System)
a- 5  9-10  12.15  96.95  5.34  144.66
m- 5  n- 5
a-10  3-10  11.00  195.15  5.63  243.48
m- 5  n-5
a- 5  P-15  11.41  146.37  5.80  193.13
m- 5  n- 5
a- 5  P-10  8.05  244.35  4.08  310.51
m-10  n- 5
a- 5  0-10  12.15  193.91  4.08  310.51
m- 5  n-10
Note:  7-100 in all cases.
Expected Profit for the system in the Pure Polyarchy equals the Expected
Profit for one  firm times  the number of firms.13
Economies of scale  in the acquisition of information account for several
of the results presented in Table 1.  Expected profit is  greater when the  firm
or firms are  able to allocate expenditure on information over a larger domain.
One example of this  is that expected profit for the Pure Hierarchy is  always
greater than the  system-wide expected profit for the Pure Polyarchy.  A second
example  is  that a doubling of the number of projects  from Case 1 to Case 4
results  in a  more than doubling of expected profit for both the Pure  Polyarchy
and the Pure Hierarchy.  Finally a doubling of the number of decentralized
units  from Case 1 to Case 5 causes  the expected profit for the Pure Hierarchy
to  increase more than two-fold.
Conclusions
The model presented here identifies  systematic ways in which  the degree
of centralization of decision making authority affects various aspects of
economic efficiency.  In particular,  it is  noted that the Pure Hierarchy
structure dominates if the objective is  to maximize expected profit.  If,
however, the objective is innovation the Pure Polyarchy dominates  since an
investment project has  the greatest chance  of being adopted in this structure.
With respect to  the agricultural cooperatives,  these issues raise questions
such as:  Were there economic and political factors that lead to  the different
industry structures when the cooperatives  formed?  How has the difference in
structure affected different aspects of economic efficiency in agricultural
cooperatives?
This superior performance by the  Pure Hierarchy  suggests a limitation
of our model and an opportunity for further study.  Decision makers  in the
decentralized units may have specific information regarding profitability
that the centralized decision maker does not have.  To reflect  this,  the14
model would incorporate a smaller variance when decisions are made in the
decentralized units as compared with the centralized units.  Further study
could also consider alternative probability distributions for  8,  alternative
forms for  the cost of information function, and alternative probability
distributions  for the initial portfolio.  The mixed case  identified here and
other mixed cases require further work, especially given the fact that they
are representative of actual  firms.  Since  it appears  that analytical
solutions will be difficult and,  in many cases,  impossible  for these mixed
structures, methods of alternative analysis,  such as Monte Carlo simulation,
need to be  explored.
The theoretical results obtained from this model offer an exciting and
challenging opportunity for empirical research.  One  of the challenges for
such research  is  to derive a control situation to which other cases can be
compared.  Measuring the cost of information, in light of the fact that
firms often employ informal  information, will be difficult.  In addition,
measuring the distribution of 8 presents a further challenge since errors,
by their very nature,  are unobservable.  The results from such empirical
research will be  of interest to  agents in both cooperatives and investor
owned firms,  as  well as  to  policy makers.  Since additional insights  into
the effect of centralization of authority on the probability of accepting
investment projects,  expected profit and acquisition of information could
have a significant impact on future actions of owners and managers,  the
challenges need to be addressed.15
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